

Director  
Central  
Intelligence

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[REDACTED]  
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**National Intelligence Daily  
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*Friday  
23 March 1984*

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
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# **LEBANON: Political Gestures Toward Christians**

*Shia and Druze militiamen are reasserting control over Palestinian fighters and the Sunni Murabitun militia in West Beirut probably is an attempt to enforce the cease-fire and facilitate talks with the Christian militia.* [REDACTED]

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Druze leader Junblatt and Amal chief Barri publicly repudiated Lebanon's traditional political processes after the talks in Lausanne. Both have called for direct negotiations with the Christian Lebanese Forces militia. They have backed away from their earlier statements that a return to violence is inevitable, and they are now expressing hopes that the cease-fire will hold. [REDACTED]

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// [REDACTED] that closer ties between the Murabitun and Palestinian dissidents had become a major hindrance to Shia and Druze political initiative and control of West Beirut. Undisciplined Murabitun and Palestinian fighters were breaking the cease-fire and accused of other disruptive activities.// [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The overture by the Shias and the Druze to the Lebanese Forces has been received favorably by representatives of the Christian militia in Beirut. Both sides may welcome a breathing space and enforce the cease-fire until new strategies evolve. They probably see the suppression of militias they consider marginal as a necessary first step. [REDACTED]

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Syria lost prestige when the talks in Lausanne failed. As a result, Damascus is likely to hold down the level of violence in order to claim that it has a positive influence in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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There is no effective mechanism, however, for policing the cease-fire. The security situation thus will remain unstable even if there are no new military offensives. [REDACTED]

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
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**SURINAME: Financial Problems**

*The economic consequences of the monthlong strike by bauxite workers have added a new sense of urgency to Paramaribo's search for foreign assistance.*

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with the suspension of other revenue-raising measures as part of the strike settlement, the budget deficit this year is expected to reach almost \$200 million.//

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growing concern among Surinamese businessmen that the Central Bank will be unable to provide foreign exchange for imports. The government already has suspended all import licenses issued before August 1983, and some importers have been denied new licenses.

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Paramaribo has failed to secure any substantial amount of hard currency assistance since December 1982. Government officials are counting on a quick infusion of IMF funds.

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Army Commander Bouterse recently announced that the government will ensure the rational allocation of foreign exchange, reduce spending, increase tax revenues, and encourage private investment to cope with the economic difficulties.

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The businessmen's concerns are likely to increase if Paramaribo drains credit available to the private sector by financing the budget deficit largely with Central Bank loans, as it did last year. Foreign exchange reserves probably can cover less than one month's worth of imports, and even tighter import restrictions will be necessary.

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Bouterse may lack the resolve or political dexterity to institute the unpopular austerity measures needed to obtain IMF funds any time soon.

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#### USSR: Problems in Training Reservists

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// [REDACTED]

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b (1) b (3) //Soviet laws permit at least five callups of each reservist for training. [REDACTED] however, shows that the typical Soviet reservist is mobilized only once or twice. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]: //Soviet combat units in Central Europe, which would conduct the initial campaign against NATO, do not rely heavily on reservists and their combat effectiveness would not be strongly affected. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Nonetheless, the Soviets are unlikely to alter their current reserve training system. Additional training would increase costs and draw manpower away from civilian sectors.// [REDACTED]

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#### SUDAN: Reaction to Bombing

b (3) [redacted] reports that the airstrikes on the government broadcasting facility last week has aroused little concern about Libyan intentions among most Sudanese. Some believe that Egypt and Sudan staged the incident to embarrass Libyan leader Qadhafi. The Sudanese who believe Libya perpetrated the attack are less concerned about Qadhafi's intentions than about the ineffectiveness of the Sudanese military. An anti-Libyan rally held by the government party the day after the attack drew only 600 people.

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[redacted] //The attack appears to have had little effect on popular support for the Nimeiri government. The lowering of public confidence in the military, however, probably will depress Army moral further. In addition, insurgents in southern Sudan may be encouraged to expand their operations.// [redacted]

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#### SOUTHERN AFRICA: Military and Political Developments

South Africa and Mozambique appear to be carrying out the terms of their recent security agreement. [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] that the commission may discuss joint military patrols in Mozambican territory. Meanwhile, [redacted]

[redacted] that a meeting of leaders of the Frontline States will be held soon. The planned meeting follows an announcement by the ANC that it will intensify its terrorist campaign against South Africa. [redacted]

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[redacted] Tanzania President Nyerere, who is chairman of the Frontline States, persuaded the other Frontline leaders to boycott the signing of the security agreement last week. The leaders probably will feel obliged to voice strong support for SWAPO and the ANC to offset increasing public sentiment that the insurgent groups have been betrayed by Angola and Mozambique. They also are likely to endorse the strong conditions for a Cuban troop withdrawal stated in the recent Angolan-Cuban communique. Nonetheless, the group probably will offer at least lukewarm backing for the Angolan and Mozambican dialogues with South Africa. [redacted]

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#### MEXICO-COSTA RICA: Financial Assistance

Mexico has loaned Costa Rica \$50 million, an amount that San Jose claims is necessary to avert technical default on its foreign bank debt. The loan is scheduled to be repaid by mid-June, [REDACTED] Mexico is insisting that its financial support should not be publicized to avoid problems with its creditors. Costa Rica also has reached preliminary agreement with the IMF on a standby loan for this year. [REDACTED] b (3)

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
b (3) [REDACTED] President Monge began to try to improve relations with Mexico last year, and his efforts are paying off. Mexico City has long insisted that the economic aid it extends is not politically motivated. This loan may be intended to restore the appearance of fairness because other Central American countries are aware of Mexico's substantial aid to Nicaragua. The loan probably will be enough to allow Costa Rica to make payments on its foreign commercial debt for the next few months, but [REDACTED] believes that it will merely delay a foreign exchange crisis until midsummer. [REDACTED] b (3)

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


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
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
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
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